| /* |
| * Copyright (C) 2013 The Android Open Source Project |
| * |
| * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); |
| * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. |
| * You may obtain a copy of the License at |
| * |
| * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 |
| * |
| * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software |
| * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, |
| * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. |
| * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and |
| * limitations under the License. |
| */ |
| |
| #include <ctype.h> |
| #include <errno.h> |
| #include <fcntl.h> |
| #include <inttypes.h> |
| #include <libgen.h> |
| #include <stdio.h> |
| #include <stdlib.h> |
| #include <string.h> |
| #include <sys/mount.h> |
| #include <sys/stat.h> |
| #include <sys/types.h> |
| #include <sys/wait.h> |
| #include <time.h> |
| #include <unistd.h> |
| |
| #include <android-base/file.h> |
| #include <android-base/properties.h> |
| #include <android-base/strings.h> |
| #include <android-base/unique_fd.h> |
| #include <crypto_utils/android_pubkey.h> |
| #include <cutils/properties.h> |
| #include <libdm/dm.h> |
| #include <logwrap/logwrap.h> |
| #include <openssl/obj_mac.h> |
| #include <openssl/rsa.h> |
| #include <openssl/sha.h> |
| |
| #include "fec/io.h" |
| |
| #include "fs_mgr.h" |
| #include "fs_mgr_priv.h" |
| |
| // Realistically, this file should be part of the android::fs_mgr namespace; |
| using namespace android::fs_mgr; |
| |
| #define VERITY_TABLE_RSA_KEY "/verity_key" |
| #define VERITY_TABLE_HASH_IDX 8 |
| #define VERITY_TABLE_SALT_IDX 9 |
| |
| #define VERITY_TABLE_OPT_RESTART "restart_on_corruption" |
| #define VERITY_TABLE_OPT_LOGGING "ignore_corruption" |
| #define VERITY_TABLE_OPT_IGNZERO "ignore_zero_blocks" |
| |
| #define VERITY_TABLE_OPT_FEC_FORMAT \ |
| "use_fec_from_device %s fec_start %" PRIu64 " fec_blocks %" PRIu64 \ |
| " fec_roots %u " VERITY_TABLE_OPT_IGNZERO |
| #define VERITY_TABLE_OPT_FEC_ARGS 9 |
| |
| #define METADATA_MAGIC 0x01564c54 |
| #define METADATA_TAG_MAX_LENGTH 63 |
| #define METADATA_EOD "eod" |
| |
| #define VERITY_LASTSIG_TAG "verity_lastsig" |
| |
| #define VERITY_STATE_TAG "verity_state" |
| #define VERITY_STATE_HEADER 0x83c0ae9d |
| #define VERITY_STATE_VERSION 1 |
| |
| #define VERITY_KMSG_RESTART "dm-verity device corrupted" |
| #define VERITY_KMSG_BUFSIZE 1024 |
| |
| #define READ_BUF_SIZE 4096 |
| |
| #define __STRINGIFY(x) #x |
| #define STRINGIFY(x) __STRINGIFY(x) |
| |
| struct verity_state { |
| uint32_t header; |
| uint32_t version; |
| int32_t mode; |
| }; |
| |
| extern struct fs_info info; |
| |
| static RSA *load_key(const char *path) |
| { |
| uint8_t key_data[ANDROID_PUBKEY_ENCODED_SIZE]; |
| |
| auto f = std::unique_ptr<FILE, decltype(&fclose)>{fopen(path, "re"), fclose}; |
| if (!f) { |
| LERROR << "Can't open " << path; |
| return nullptr; |
| } |
| |
| if (!fread(key_data, sizeof(key_data), 1, f.get())) { |
| LERROR << "Could not read key!"; |
| return nullptr; |
| } |
| |
| RSA* key = nullptr; |
| if (!android_pubkey_decode(key_data, sizeof(key_data), &key)) { |
| LERROR << "Could not parse key!"; |
| return nullptr; |
| } |
| |
| return key; |
| } |
| |
| static int verify_table(const uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_size, |
| const char *table, uint32_t table_length) |
| { |
| RSA *key; |
| uint8_t hash_buf[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH]; |
| int retval = -1; |
| |
| // Hash the table |
| SHA256((uint8_t*)table, table_length, hash_buf); |
| |
| // Now get the public key from the keyfile |
| key = load_key(VERITY_TABLE_RSA_KEY); |
| if (!key) { |
| LERROR << "Couldn't load verity keys"; |
| goto out; |
| } |
| |
| // verify the result |
| if (!RSA_verify(NID_sha256, hash_buf, sizeof(hash_buf), signature, |
| signature_size, key)) { |
| LERROR << "Couldn't verify table"; |
| goto out; |
| } |
| |
| retval = 0; |
| |
| out: |
| RSA_free(key); |
| return retval; |
| } |
| |
| static int verify_verity_signature(const struct fec_verity_metadata& verity) |
| { |
| if (verify_table(verity.signature, sizeof(verity.signature), |
| verity.table, verity.table_length) == 0 || |
| verify_table(verity.ecc_signature, sizeof(verity.ecc_signature), |
| verity.table, verity.table_length) == 0) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| static int invalidate_table(char *table, size_t table_length) |
| { |
| size_t n = 0; |
| size_t idx = 0; |
| size_t cleared = 0; |
| |
| while (n < table_length) { |
| if (table[n++] == ' ') { |
| ++idx; |
| } |
| |
| if (idx != VERITY_TABLE_HASH_IDX && idx != VERITY_TABLE_SALT_IDX) { |
| continue; |
| } |
| |
| while (n < table_length && table[n] != ' ') { |
| table[n++] = '0'; |
| } |
| |
| if (++cleared == 2) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| struct verity_table_params { |
| char *table; |
| int mode; |
| struct fec_ecc_metadata ecc; |
| const char *ecc_dev; |
| }; |
| |
| typedef bool (*format_verity_table_func)(char *buf, const size_t bufsize, |
| const struct verity_table_params *params); |
| |
| static bool format_verity_table(char *buf, const size_t bufsize, |
| const struct verity_table_params *params) |
| { |
| const char *mode_flag = NULL; |
| int res = -1; |
| |
| if (params->mode == VERITY_MODE_RESTART) { |
| mode_flag = VERITY_TABLE_OPT_RESTART; |
| } else if (params->mode == VERITY_MODE_LOGGING) { |
| mode_flag = VERITY_TABLE_OPT_LOGGING; |
| } |
| |
| if (params->ecc.valid) { |
| if (mode_flag) { |
| res = snprintf(buf, bufsize, |
| "%s %u %s " VERITY_TABLE_OPT_FEC_FORMAT, |
| params->table, 1 + VERITY_TABLE_OPT_FEC_ARGS, mode_flag, params->ecc_dev, |
| params->ecc.start / FEC_BLOCKSIZE, params->ecc.blocks, params->ecc.roots); |
| } else { |
| res = snprintf(buf, bufsize, |
| "%s %u " VERITY_TABLE_OPT_FEC_FORMAT, |
| params->table, VERITY_TABLE_OPT_FEC_ARGS, params->ecc_dev, |
| params->ecc.start / FEC_BLOCKSIZE, params->ecc.blocks, params->ecc.roots); |
| } |
| } else if (mode_flag) { |
| res = snprintf(buf, bufsize, "%s 2 " VERITY_TABLE_OPT_IGNZERO " %s", params->table, |
| mode_flag); |
| } else { |
| res = snprintf(buf, bufsize, "%s 1 " VERITY_TABLE_OPT_IGNZERO, params->table); |
| } |
| |
| if (res < 0 || (size_t)res >= bufsize) { |
| LERROR << "Error building verity table; insufficient buffer size?"; |
| return false; |
| } |
| |
| return true; |
| } |
| |
| static bool format_legacy_verity_table(char *buf, const size_t bufsize, |
| const struct verity_table_params *params) |
| { |
| int res; |
| |
| if (params->mode == VERITY_MODE_EIO) { |
| res = strlcpy(buf, params->table, bufsize); |
| } else { |
| res = snprintf(buf, bufsize, "%s %d", params->table, params->mode); |
| } |
| |
| if (res < 0 || (size_t)res >= bufsize) { |
| LERROR << "Error building verity table; insufficient buffer size?"; |
| return false; |
| } |
| |
| return true; |
| } |
| |
| static int load_verity_table(android::dm::DeviceMapper& dm, const std::string& name, |
| uint64_t device_size, const struct verity_table_params* params, |
| format_verity_table_func format) { |
| android::dm::DmTable table; |
| table.set_readonly(true); |
| |
| char buffer[DM_BUF_SIZE]; |
| if (!format(buffer, sizeof(buffer), params)) { |
| LERROR << "Failed to format verity parameters"; |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| android::dm::DmTargetVerityString target(0, device_size / 512, buffer); |
| if (!table.AddTarget(std::make_unique<decltype(target)>(target))) { |
| LERROR << "Failed to add verity target"; |
| return -1; |
| } |
| if (!dm.CreateDevice(name, table)) { |
| LERROR << "Failed to create verity device \"" << name << "\""; |
| return -1; |
| } |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static int check_verity_restart(const char *fname) |
| { |
| char buffer[VERITY_KMSG_BUFSIZE + 1]; |
| int fd; |
| int rc = 0; |
| ssize_t size; |
| struct stat s; |
| |
| fd = TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(open(fname, O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC)); |
| |
| if (fd == -1) { |
| if (errno != ENOENT) { |
| PERROR << "Failed to open " << fname; |
| } |
| goto out; |
| } |
| |
| if (fstat(fd, &s) == -1) { |
| PERROR << "Failed to fstat " << fname; |
| goto out; |
| } |
| |
| size = VERITY_KMSG_BUFSIZE; |
| |
| if (size > s.st_size) { |
| size = s.st_size; |
| } |
| |
| if (lseek(fd, s.st_size - size, SEEK_SET) == -1) { |
| PERROR << "Failed to lseek " << (intmax_t)(s.st_size - size) << " " << fname; |
| goto out; |
| } |
| |
| if (!android::base::ReadFully(fd, buffer, size)) { |
| PERROR << "Failed to read " << size << " bytes from " << fname; |
| goto out; |
| } |
| |
| buffer[size] = '\0'; |
| |
| if (strstr(buffer, VERITY_KMSG_RESTART) != NULL) { |
| rc = 1; |
| } |
| |
| out: |
| if (fd != -1) { |
| close(fd); |
| } |
| |
| return rc; |
| } |
| |
| static int was_verity_restart() |
| { |
| static const char* files[] = { |
| // clang-format off |
| "/sys/fs/pstore/console-ramoops-0", |
| "/sys/fs/pstore/console-ramoops", |
| "/proc/last_kmsg", |
| NULL |
| // clang-format on |
| }; |
| int i; |
| |
| for (i = 0; files[i]; ++i) { |
| if (check_verity_restart(files[i])) { |
| return 1; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static int metadata_add(FILE *fp, long start, const char *tag, |
| unsigned int length, off64_t *offset) |
| { |
| if (fseek(fp, start, SEEK_SET) < 0 || |
| fprintf(fp, "%s %u\n", tag, length) < 0) { |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| *offset = ftell(fp); |
| |
| if (fseek(fp, length, SEEK_CUR) < 0 || |
| fprintf(fp, METADATA_EOD " 0\n") < 0) { |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static int metadata_find(const char *fname, const char *stag, |
| unsigned int slength, off64_t *offset) |
| { |
| char tag[METADATA_TAG_MAX_LENGTH + 1]; |
| int rc = -1; |
| int n; |
| long start = 0x4000; /* skip cryptfs metadata area */ |
| uint32_t magic; |
| unsigned int length = 0; |
| |
| if (!fname) { |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| auto fp = std::unique_ptr<FILE, decltype(&fclose)>{fopen(fname, "re+"), fclose}; |
| |
| if (!fp) { |
| PERROR << "Failed to open " << fname; |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| /* check magic */ |
| if (fseek(fp.get(), start, SEEK_SET) < 0 || fread(&magic, sizeof(magic), 1, fp.get()) != 1) { |
| PERROR << "Failed to read magic from " << fname; |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| if (magic != METADATA_MAGIC) { |
| magic = METADATA_MAGIC; |
| |
| if (fseek(fp.get(), start, SEEK_SET) < 0 || |
| fwrite(&magic, sizeof(magic), 1, fp.get()) != 1) { |
| PERROR << "Failed to write magic to " << fname; |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| rc = metadata_add(fp.get(), start + sizeof(magic), stag, slength, offset); |
| if (rc < 0) { |
| PERROR << "Failed to add metadata to " << fname; |
| } |
| |
| return rc; |
| } |
| |
| start += sizeof(magic); |
| |
| while (1) { |
| n = fscanf(fp.get(), "%" STRINGIFY(METADATA_TAG_MAX_LENGTH) "s %u\n", tag, &length); |
| |
| if (n == 2 && strcmp(tag, METADATA_EOD)) { |
| /* found a tag */ |
| start = ftell(fp.get()); |
| |
| if (!strcmp(tag, stag) && length == slength) { |
| *offset = start; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| start += length; |
| |
| if (fseek(fp.get(), length, SEEK_CUR) < 0) { |
| PERROR << "Failed to seek " << fname; |
| return -1; |
| } |
| } else { |
| rc = metadata_add(fp.get(), start, stag, slength, offset); |
| if (rc < 0) { |
| PERROR << "Failed to write metadata to " << fname; |
| } |
| return rc; |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| |
| static int write_verity_state(const char *fname, off64_t offset, int32_t mode) |
| { |
| int fd; |
| int rc = -1; |
| struct verity_state s = { VERITY_STATE_HEADER, VERITY_STATE_VERSION, mode }; |
| |
| fd = TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(open(fname, O_WRONLY | O_SYNC | O_CLOEXEC)); |
| |
| if (fd == -1) { |
| PERROR << "Failed to open " << fname; |
| goto out; |
| } |
| |
| if (TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(pwrite64(fd, &s, sizeof(s), offset)) != sizeof(s)) { |
| PERROR << "Failed to write " << sizeof(s) << " bytes to " << fname |
| << " to offset " << offset; |
| goto out; |
| } |
| |
| rc = 0; |
| |
| out: |
| if (fd != -1) { |
| close(fd); |
| } |
| |
| return rc; |
| } |
| |
| static int read_verity_state(const char *fname, off64_t offset, int *mode) |
| { |
| int fd = -1; |
| int rc = -1; |
| struct verity_state s; |
| |
| fd = TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(open(fname, O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC)); |
| |
| if (fd == -1) { |
| PERROR << "Failed to open " << fname; |
| goto out; |
| } |
| |
| if (TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(pread64(fd, &s, sizeof(s), offset)) != sizeof(s)) { |
| PERROR << "Failed to read " << sizeof(s) << " bytes from " << fname |
| << " offset " << offset; |
| goto out; |
| } |
| |
| if (s.header != VERITY_STATE_HEADER) { |
| /* space allocated, but no state written. write default state */ |
| *mode = VERITY_MODE_DEFAULT; |
| rc = write_verity_state(fname, offset, *mode); |
| goto out; |
| } |
| |
| if (s.version != VERITY_STATE_VERSION) { |
| LERROR << "Unsupported verity state version (" << s.version << ")"; |
| goto out; |
| } |
| |
| if (s.mode < VERITY_MODE_EIO || |
| s.mode > VERITY_MODE_LAST) { |
| LERROR << "Unsupported verity mode (" << s.mode << ")"; |
| goto out; |
| } |
| |
| *mode = s.mode; |
| rc = 0; |
| |
| out: |
| if (fd != -1) { |
| close(fd); |
| } |
| |
| return rc; |
| } |
| |
| static int read_partition(const char *path, uint64_t size) |
| { |
| char buf[READ_BUF_SIZE]; |
| ssize_t size_read; |
| android::base::unique_fd fd(TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(open(path, O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC))); |
| |
| if (fd == -1) { |
| PERROR << "Failed to open " << path; |
| return -errno; |
| } |
| |
| while (size) { |
| size_read = TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(read(fd, buf, READ_BUF_SIZE)); |
| if (size_read == -1) { |
| PERROR << "Error in reading partition " << path; |
| return -errno; |
| } |
| size -= size_read; |
| } |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static int compare_last_signature(const FstabEntry& entry, int* match) { |
| char tag[METADATA_TAG_MAX_LENGTH + 1]; |
| int fd = -1; |
| int rc = -1; |
| off64_t offset = 0; |
| struct fec_handle *f = NULL; |
| struct fec_verity_metadata verity; |
| uint8_t curr[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH]; |
| uint8_t prev[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH]; |
| |
| *match = 1; |
| |
| if (fec_open(&f, entry.blk_device.c_str(), O_RDONLY, FEC_VERITY_DISABLE, FEC_DEFAULT_ROOTS) == |
| -1) { |
| PERROR << "Failed to open '" << entry.blk_device << "'"; |
| return rc; |
| } |
| |
| // read verity metadata |
| if (fec_verity_get_metadata(f, &verity) == -1) { |
| PERROR << "Failed to get verity metadata '" << entry.blk_device << "'"; |
| goto out; |
| } |
| |
| SHA256(verity.signature, sizeof(verity.signature), curr); |
| |
| if (snprintf(tag, sizeof(tag), VERITY_LASTSIG_TAG "_%s", basename(entry.mount_point.c_str())) >= |
| (int)sizeof(tag)) { |
| LERROR << "Metadata tag name too long for " << entry.mount_point; |
| goto out; |
| } |
| |
| if (metadata_find(entry.verity_loc.c_str(), tag, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, &offset) < 0) { |
| goto out; |
| } |
| |
| fd = TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(open(entry.verity_loc.c_str(), O_RDWR | O_SYNC | O_CLOEXEC)); |
| |
| if (fd == -1) { |
| PERROR << "Failed to open " << entry.verity_loc; |
| goto out; |
| } |
| |
| if (TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(pread64(fd, prev, sizeof(prev), offset)) != sizeof(prev)) { |
| PERROR << "Failed to read " << sizeof(prev) << " bytes from " << entry.verity_loc |
| << " offset " << offset; |
| goto out; |
| } |
| |
| *match = !memcmp(curr, prev, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH); |
| |
| if (!*match) { |
| /* update current signature hash */ |
| if (TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(pwrite64(fd, curr, sizeof(curr), |
| offset)) != sizeof(curr)) { |
| PERROR << "Failed to write " << sizeof(curr) << " bytes to " << entry.verity_loc |
| << " offset " << offset; |
| goto out; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| rc = 0; |
| |
| out: |
| fec_close(f); |
| return rc; |
| } |
| |
| static int get_verity_state_offset(const FstabEntry& entry, off64_t* offset) { |
| char tag[METADATA_TAG_MAX_LENGTH + 1]; |
| |
| if (snprintf(tag, sizeof(tag), VERITY_STATE_TAG "_%s", basename(entry.mount_point.c_str())) >= |
| (int)sizeof(tag)) { |
| LERROR << "Metadata tag name too long for " << entry.mount_point; |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| return metadata_find(entry.verity_loc.c_str(), tag, sizeof(struct verity_state), offset); |
| } |
| |
| int load_verity_state(const FstabEntry& entry, int* mode) { |
| // unless otherwise specified, use EIO mode. |
| *mode = VERITY_MODE_EIO; |
| |
| // use the kernel parameter if set. |
| std::string veritymode; |
| if (fs_mgr_get_boot_config("veritymode", &veritymode)) { |
| if (veritymode == "enforcing") { |
| *mode = VERITY_MODE_DEFAULT; |
| } |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| off64_t offset = 0; |
| if (get_verity_state_offset(entry, &offset) < 0) { |
| /* fall back to stateless behavior */ |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (was_verity_restart()) { |
| /* device was restarted after dm-verity detected a corrupted |
| * block, so use EIO mode */ |
| return write_verity_state(entry.verity_loc.c_str(), offset, *mode); |
| } |
| |
| int match = 0; |
| if (!compare_last_signature(entry, &match) && !match) { |
| /* partition has been reflashed, reset dm-verity state */ |
| *mode = VERITY_MODE_DEFAULT; |
| return write_verity_state(entry.verity_loc.c_str(), offset, *mode); |
| } |
| |
| return read_verity_state(entry.verity_loc.c_str(), offset, mode); |
| } |
| |
| // Update the verity table using the actual block device path. |
| // Two cases: |
| // Case-1: verity table is shared for devices with different by-name prefix. |
| // Example: |
| // verity table token: /dev/block/bootdevice/by-name/vendor |
| // blk_device-1 (non-A/B): /dev/block/platform/soc.0/7824900.sdhci/by-name/vendor |
| // blk_device-2 (A/B): /dev/block/platform/soc.0/f9824900.sdhci/by-name/vendor_a |
| // |
| // Case-2: append A/B suffix in the verity table. |
| // Example: |
| // verity table token: /dev/block/platform/soc.0/7824900.sdhci/by-name/vendor |
| // blk_device: /dev/block/platform/soc.0/7824900.sdhci/by-name/vendor_a |
| static void update_verity_table_blk_device(const std::string& blk_device, char** table, |
| bool slot_select) { |
| bool updated = false; |
| std::string result, ab_suffix; |
| auto tokens = android::base::Split(*table, " "); |
| |
| // If slot_select is set, it means blk_device is already updated with ab_suffix. |
| if (slot_select) ab_suffix = fs_mgr_get_slot_suffix(); |
| |
| for (const auto& token : tokens) { |
| std::string new_token; |
| if (android::base::StartsWith(token, "/dev/block/")) { |
| if (token == blk_device) return; // no need to update if they're already the same. |
| std::size_t found1 = blk_device.find("by-name"); |
| std::size_t found2 = token.find("by-name"); |
| if (found1 != std::string::npos && found2 != std::string::npos && |
| blk_device.substr(found1) == token.substr(found2) + ab_suffix) { |
| new_token = blk_device; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (!new_token.empty()) { |
| updated = true; |
| LINFO << "Verity table: updated block device from '" << token << "' to '" << new_token |
| << "'"; |
| } else { |
| new_token = token; |
| } |
| |
| if (result.empty()) { |
| result = new_token; |
| } else { |
| result += " " + new_token; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (!updated) { |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| free(*table); |
| *table = strdup(result.c_str()); |
| } |
| |
| // prepares the verity enabled (MF_VERIFY / MF_VERIFYATBOOT) fstab record for |
| // mount. The 'wait_for_verity_dev' parameter makes this function wait for the |
| // verity device to get created before return |
| int fs_mgr_setup_verity(FstabEntry* entry, bool wait_for_verity_dev) { |
| int retval = FS_MGR_SETUP_VERITY_FAIL; |
| int fd = -1; |
| std::string verity_blk_name; |
| struct fec_handle *f = NULL; |
| struct fec_verity_metadata verity; |
| struct verity_table_params params = { .table = NULL }; |
| |
| const std::string mount_point(basename(entry->mount_point.c_str())); |
| bool verified_at_boot = false; |
| |
| android::dm::DeviceMapper& dm = android::dm::DeviceMapper::Instance(); |
| |
| if (fec_open(&f, entry->blk_device.c_str(), O_RDONLY, FEC_VERITY_DISABLE, FEC_DEFAULT_ROOTS) < |
| 0) { |
| PERROR << "Failed to open '" << entry->blk_device << "'"; |
| return retval; |
| } |
| |
| // read verity metadata |
| if (fec_verity_get_metadata(f, &verity) < 0) { |
| PERROR << "Failed to get verity metadata '" << entry->blk_device << "'"; |
| // Allow verity disabled when the device is unlocked without metadata |
| if (fs_mgr_is_device_unlocked()) { |
| retval = FS_MGR_SETUP_VERITY_SKIPPED; |
| LWARNING << "Allow invalid metadata when the device is unlocked"; |
| } |
| goto out; |
| } |
| |
| #ifdef ALLOW_ADBD_DISABLE_VERITY |
| if (verity.disabled) { |
| retval = FS_MGR_SETUP_VERITY_DISABLED; |
| LINFO << "Attempt to cleanly disable verity - only works in USERDEBUG/ENG"; |
| goto out; |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| // read ecc metadata |
| if (fec_ecc_get_metadata(f, ¶ms.ecc) < 0) { |
| params.ecc.valid = false; |
| } |
| |
| params.ecc_dev = entry->blk_device.c_str(); |
| |
| if (load_verity_state(*entry, ¶ms.mode) < 0) { |
| /* if accessing or updating the state failed, switch to the default |
| * safe mode. This makes sure the device won't end up in an endless |
| * restart loop, and no corrupted data will be exposed to userspace |
| * without a warning. */ |
| params.mode = VERITY_MODE_EIO; |
| } |
| |
| if (!verity.table) { |
| goto out; |
| } |
| |
| params.table = strdup(verity.table); |
| if (!params.table) { |
| goto out; |
| } |
| |
| // verify the signature on the table |
| if (verify_verity_signature(verity) < 0) { |
| // Allow signature verification error when the device is unlocked |
| if (fs_mgr_is_device_unlocked()) { |
| retval = FS_MGR_SETUP_VERITY_SKIPPED; |
| LWARNING << "Allow signature verification error when the device is unlocked"; |
| goto out; |
| } |
| if (params.mode == VERITY_MODE_LOGGING) { |
| // the user has been warned, allow mounting without dm-verity |
| retval = FS_MGR_SETUP_VERITY_SKIPPED; |
| goto out; |
| } |
| |
| // invalidate root hash and salt to trigger device-specific recovery |
| if (invalidate_table(params.table, verity.table_length) < 0) { |
| goto out; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| LINFO << "Enabling dm-verity for " << mount_point.c_str() |
| << " (mode " << params.mode << ")"; |
| |
| // Update the verity params using the actual block device path |
| update_verity_table_blk_device(entry->blk_device, ¶ms.table, |
| entry->fs_mgr_flags.slot_select); |
| |
| // load the verity mapping table |
| if (load_verity_table(dm, mount_point, verity.data_size, ¶ms, format_verity_table) == 0) { |
| goto loaded; |
| } |
| |
| if (params.ecc.valid) { |
| // kernel may not support error correction, try without |
| LINFO << "Disabling error correction for " << mount_point.c_str(); |
| params.ecc.valid = false; |
| |
| if (load_verity_table(dm, mount_point, verity.data_size, ¶ms, format_verity_table) == 0) { |
| goto loaded; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| // try the legacy format for backwards compatibility |
| if (load_verity_table(dm, mount_point, verity.data_size, ¶ms, format_legacy_verity_table) == |
| 0) { |
| goto loaded; |
| } |
| |
| if (params.mode != VERITY_MODE_EIO) { |
| // as a last resort, EIO mode should always be supported |
| LINFO << "Falling back to EIO mode for " << mount_point.c_str(); |
| params.mode = VERITY_MODE_EIO; |
| |
| if (load_verity_table(dm, mount_point, verity.data_size, ¶ms, |
| format_legacy_verity_table) == 0) { |
| goto loaded; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| LERROR << "Failed to load verity table for " << mount_point.c_str(); |
| goto out; |
| |
| loaded: |
| if (!dm.GetDmDevicePathByName(mount_point, &verity_blk_name)) { |
| LERROR << "Couldn't get verity device number!"; |
| goto out; |
| } |
| |
| // mark the underlying block device as read-only |
| fs_mgr_set_blk_ro(entry->blk_device); |
| |
| // Verify the entire partition in one go |
| // If there is an error, allow it to mount as a normal verity partition. |
| if (entry->fs_mgr_flags.verify_at_boot) { |
| LINFO << "Verifying partition " << entry->blk_device << " at boot"; |
| int err = read_partition(verity_blk_name.c_str(), verity.data_size); |
| if (!err) { |
| LINFO << "Verified verity partition " << entry->blk_device << " at boot"; |
| verified_at_boot = true; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| // assign the new verity block device as the block device |
| if (!verified_at_boot) { |
| entry->blk_device = verity_blk_name; |
| } else if (!dm.DeleteDevice(mount_point)) { |
| LERROR << "Failed to remove verity device " << mount_point.c_str(); |
| goto out; |
| } |
| |
| // make sure we've set everything up properly |
| if (wait_for_verity_dev && !fs_mgr_wait_for_file(entry->blk_device, 1s)) { |
| goto out; |
| } |
| |
| retval = FS_MGR_SETUP_VERITY_SUCCESS; |
| |
| out: |
| if (fd != -1) { |
| close(fd); |
| } |
| |
| fec_close(f); |
| free(params.table); |
| |
| return retval; |
| } |