diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c
index 9da6420..1d027e2 100644
--- a/security/selinux/avc.c
+++ b/security/selinux/avc.c
@@ -471,6 +471,7 @@
  * @avd: access vector decisions
  * @result: result from avc_has_perm_noaudit
  * @a:  auxiliary audit data
+ * @flags: VFS walk flags
  *
  * Audit the granting or denial of permissions in accordance
  * with the policy.  This function is typically called by
@@ -481,9 +482,10 @@
  * be performed under a lock, to allow the lock to be released
  * before calling the auditing code.
  */
-void avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
+int avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
 	       u16 tclass, u32 requested,
-	       struct av_decision *avd, int result, struct common_audit_data *a)
+	       struct av_decision *avd, int result, struct common_audit_data *a,
+	       unsigned flags)
 {
 	struct common_audit_data stack_data;
 	u32 denied, audited;
@@ -515,11 +517,24 @@
 	else
 		audited = requested & avd->auditallow;
 	if (!audited)
-		return;
+		return 0;
+
 	if (!a) {
 		a = &stack_data;
 		COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(a, NONE);
 	}
+
+	/*
+	 * When in a RCU walk do the audit on the RCU retry.  This is because
+	 * the collection of the dname in an inode audit message is not RCU
+	 * safe.  Note this may drop some audits when the situation changes
+	 * during retry. However this is logically just as if the operation
+	 * happened a little later.
+	 */
+	if ((a->type == LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FS) &&
+	    (flags & IPERM_FLAG_RCU))
+		return -ECHILD;
+
 	a->selinux_audit_data.tclass = tclass;
 	a->selinux_audit_data.requested = requested;
 	a->selinux_audit_data.ssid = ssid;
@@ -529,6 +544,7 @@
 	a->lsm_pre_audit = avc_audit_pre_callback;
 	a->lsm_post_audit = avc_audit_post_callback;
 	common_lsm_audit(a);
+	return 0;
 }
 
 /**
@@ -793,6 +809,7 @@
  * @tclass: target security class
  * @requested: requested permissions, interpreted based on @tclass
  * @auditdata: auxiliary audit data
+ * @flags: VFS walk flags
  *
  * Check the AVC to determine whether the @requested permissions are granted
  * for the SID pair (@ssid, @tsid), interpreting the permissions
@@ -802,14 +819,19 @@
  * permissions are granted, -%EACCES if any permissions are denied, or
  * another -errno upon other errors.
  */
-int avc_has_perm(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
-		 u32 requested, struct common_audit_data *auditdata)
+int avc_has_perm_flags(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
+		       u32 requested, struct common_audit_data *auditdata,
+		       unsigned flags)
 {
 	struct av_decision avd;
-	int rc;
+	int rc, rc2;
 
 	rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, 0, &avd);
-	avc_audit(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, &avd, rc, auditdata);
+
+	rc2 = avc_audit(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, &avd, rc, auditdata,
+			flags);
+	if (rc2)
+		return rc2;
 	return rc;
 }
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 9a220be..ed5f29a 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -1447,8 +1447,11 @@
 	}
 
 	rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, sid, sclass, av, 0, &avd);
-	if (audit == SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT)
-		avc_audit(sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad);
+	if (audit == SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) {
+		int rc2 = avc_audit(sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad, 0);
+		if (rc2)
+			return rc2;
+	}
 	return rc;
 }
 
@@ -1468,7 +1471,8 @@
 static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
 			  struct inode *inode,
 			  u32 perms,
-			  struct common_audit_data *adp)
+			  struct common_audit_data *adp,
+			  unsigned flags)
 {
 	struct inode_security_struct *isec;
 	struct common_audit_data ad;
@@ -1488,7 +1492,7 @@
 		ad.u.fs.inode = inode;
 	}
 
-	return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
+	return avc_has_perm_flags(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp, flags);
 }
 
 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
@@ -1505,7 +1509,7 @@
 	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
 	ad.u.fs.path.mnt = mnt;
 	ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
-	return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
+	return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad, 0);
 }
 
 /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
@@ -1541,7 +1545,7 @@
 	/* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
 	rc = 0;
 	if (av)
-		rc = inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
+		rc = inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad, 0);
 
 out:
 	return rc;
@@ -2103,7 +2107,7 @@
 			file = file_priv->file;
 			inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
 			if (inode_has_perm(cred, inode,
-					   FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE, NULL)) {
+					   FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE, NULL, 0)) {
 				drop_tty = 1;
 			}
 		}
@@ -2649,10 +2653,6 @@
 	if (!mask)
 		return 0;
 
-	/* May be droppable after audit */
-	if (flags & IPERM_FLAG_RCU)
-		return -ECHILD;
-
 	COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
 	ad.u.fs.inode = inode;
 
@@ -2661,7 +2661,7 @@
 
 	perms = file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask);
 
-	return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, perms, &ad);
+	return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, perms, &ad, flags);
 }
 
 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
@@ -3208,7 +3208,7 @@
 	 * new inode label or new policy.
 	 * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
 	 */
-	return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, open_file_to_av(file), NULL);
+	return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, open_file_to_av(file), NULL, 0);
 }
 
 /* task security operations */
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/avc.h b/security/selinux/include/avc.h
index 5615081..e77b2ac 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/avc.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/avc.h
@@ -54,11 +54,11 @@
 
 void __init avc_init(void);
 
-void avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
+int avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
 	       u16 tclass, u32 requested,
 	       struct av_decision *avd,
 	       int result,
-	       struct common_audit_data *a);
+	      struct common_audit_data *a, unsigned flags);
 
 #define AVC_STRICT 1 /* Ignore permissive mode. */
 int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
@@ -66,9 +66,17 @@
 			 unsigned flags,
 			 struct av_decision *avd);
 
-int avc_has_perm(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
-		 u16 tclass, u32 requested,
-		 struct common_audit_data *auditdata);
+int avc_has_perm_flags(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
+		       u16 tclass, u32 requested,
+		       struct common_audit_data *auditdata,
+		       unsigned);
+
+static inline int avc_has_perm(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
+			       u16 tclass, u32 requested,
+			       struct common_audit_data *auditdata)
+{
+	return avc_has_perm_flags(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, auditdata, 0);
+}
 
 u32 avc_policy_seqno(void);